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RESUMEN: Un asunto caribeño. La liberalización del comercio de esclavos en el Caribe hispánico, 1784-1791.- 
La liberalización del comercio de esclavos en el Caribe hispánico culminó una serie de medidas políticas que trata-
ron de revitalizar el esclavismo en la región. Tras firmar dos contratas para el abastecimiento de esclavos, la monar-
quía española decidió flexibilizar los mecanismos para su introducción. Esta política confirmó a Cuba, especialmente 
a La Habana, como la región esclavista más importante. Mientras La Habana estuvo conectada al comercio atlántico 
de esclavos, además de a circuitos intercoloniales, el resto de puertos habilitados obtuvieron sus esclavos de otros 
territorios caribeños, gracias al aporte de comerciantes españoles, británicos, holandeses, daneses y estadounidenses, 
constituyéndose este comercio regional como dominante en este periodo.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Comercio atlántico de esclavos; Comercio intercolonial; Cuba; Venezuela; Puerto Rico; San-
to Domingo.
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On May 17 1789, the English frigate Mosley Hill, 
captained by Joseph Fayrer, moored in La Guaira. Be-
tween 1785 and 1789, the ship had undertaken four voy-
ages to and from harbours such as Bonny in West Africa 
and La Guaira, Trinidad, and Havana.1 These voyages 
followed the granting of asiento to the Liverpool-based 
trading house Baker and Dawson,2 which owned the ship. 
The ship had left the coast of Benin and, after touching at 
Trinidad, sailed straight to La Guaira. There, the captain, 
along with the Liverpool company´s representative, Phil-
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ip Langton, approached the Intendente of Caracas, Juan 
Gillelmi, to ask whether the 453 slaves in the ship’s hold 
could be considered part of the recently expired asiento. 
On February 28 1789, the liberalisation of the market had 
brought Baker and Dawson’s to an end, but conditions es-
tablished in the terms of the agreement were to still apply 
to Baker and Dawson ships that had left Europe before 
the date of the proclamation. Once the Intendente con-
firmed that the contract still applied to the Mosley Hill’s 
enslaved Africans, Baker and Dawson´s representatives 
asked him to summon local landowners to whom they 
could sell the slaves. Neither Fayrer nor Langton were 
willing to risk unloading the slaves before the buyers 
were guaranteed. The meeting took place, but the results 
were not as expected because the hacendados from Cara-
cas demanded be allowed to buy the slaves on credit, with 
the money to be paid in instalments, offering neither pre-
cious metal nor other assets as a guarantee. As a result, 
Fayrer and Langton decided to set sail for Havana, the 
main slave market in the Spanish Caribbean, where they 
hoped to sell their cargo.
Fayrer’s decision is neither surprising nor unprece-
dented; along with William Forbes, the skipper of the 
frigate Garlant, he had previously gone to Havana to sell 
those slaves that could not be sold in La Guaira. These 
expeditions linked the three main locations in the Spanish 
Caribbean where Baker and Dawson introduced slaves 
from 1784 onwards. In late 1788, the demands of the Ha-
vana oligarchy, which was tremendously influential in 
Madrid, drove the monarchy to refuse to renew the asien-
to and to liberalise the slave trade in the ports of Havana, 
Santiago de Cuba (in this case, for Spanish ships only), 
Santo Domingo, San Juan de Puerto Rico and, La Guaira 
and Puerto Cabello, in the Province of Caracas. This 
measure opened up free trade links between Spanish ter-
ritories, and their main slave-supply regions, which were 
located in ‘neighbouring foreign colonies’ rather than on 
the western coast of Africa.
The Liberalisation of the slave trade proclaimed in 
February 1789 provided a major boost to the slave trade, 
significantly increasing the number of arrivals. Cuba 
profited more than any other territory from this measure, 
since it absorbed most of the new arrivals. In addition, the 
liberalisation of the trade suppressed the barriers that oth-
er colonial powers had faced before this date. In fact, the 
new legal framework legitimised and regulated previous 
contraband practices, which played a crucial role in main-
taining the cohesion of the Caribbean. Jamaica, Domini-
ca, Saint Thomas, and Saint Croix, among others, became 
the main suppliers of slaves to the Spanish territories, act-
ing as middlemen between the Spanish Caribbean and the 
West African coast (O’Malley, 2014: 271). 
Havana, however, was an exception to this general 
model because it served as a hub for both inter-Caribbean 
commercial circuits and for French slave merchant with 
Africa s who traded in Africa.n -Caribbean commercial 
circuits and for British, American, and to a lBritish, 
American, and French slave merchants arriving directly 
from Africa (similar developments would take place later 
in the Río de la Plata). This paper argues that the coexis­
tence of Caribbean and Atlantic slave routes was essential 
in keeping up with Havana’s high demand for slaves, and 
this turned the city into the main slave market in the 
Spanish Caribbean. Although other territories were also 
affected by the liberalisation process, they never experi-
enced a commensurate development of the slave trade 
system. The arrival of slaves to the Spanish Caribbean 
was made possible through the combined actions of Brit-
ish agents, Americans (connected with Atlantic networks) 
and, especially, Spanish buyers, who acquired slaves in 
colonies such as Jamaica, Dominica, Curaçao, and the 
Danish West Indies (O’Malley and Borucki, 2017: 315-
338). The arrival of slaves directly from Africa chiefly af-
fected the port of Havana, although, most of the slaves 
arriving in Cuba came from other Caribbean dominions. 
Spain’s inability to establish direct supply centres in West 
Africa strengthened regional Caribbean trade circuits, in 
which Spanish merchants played a major role, albeit not a 
dominant one, largely as purchasers of slaves (Pearce, 
2014). 
SEEKiNg A PANACEA: SPANiSh DEPENDENCE 
ON BRiTiSh TRADERS
The end of the War of Jenkins’ Ear had serious reper-
cussions for Spanish policies regarding slavery. A few 
years after this event, in 1750, Spain and Great Britain 
signed the Treaty of Madrid, which brought the British 
asiento to an end (Donoso, 2007: 105-144). During this 
same year, the Spanish monarchy decided to stop return-
ing fugitive slaves to Britain and Holland (their main 
competitors during the war), thereby transforming trans-
imperial marronage into a tool for international diploma-
cy (Rupert, 2013:199-232; Belmonte, 2017: 43-70; 
Aizpurúa, 2008: 81-94). These measures aimed to rid 
Spain of its previous dependence on British slave suppli-
ers. When the British asiento had been in force, however, 
Jamaica had played a major role in the intra-regional 
slave trade to Cuba as the main redistribution centre for 
slaves who had survived the Middle Passage (García 
Rodríguez, 2008: 189-214). Thus the implementation of 
the monarchy’s new policy was riddled with difficulties 
from the start. The creation of the Compañía Gaditana de 
Negros, in 1765, was the most daring attempt to create a 
trade structure that could operate independently of the 
major British dealers. However, its inability to acquire 
slaves directly from West Africa, along with the unwise 
decision to establish the company’s headquarters in San 
Juan de Puerto Rico, where demand for slaves was sig-
nificantly lower than in other territories such as Cuba, 
made the company unviable. Its bankruptcy forced the 
monarchy to reach a series of compromises in order to 
save the project. The company was restructured with an 
increased capital base thanks to investments from Cuban 
merchants, such as Enrile, who moved the company’s 
headquarters to Havana in 1773.3Between 1773 and 1779, 
the number of slaves arriving in Havana increased signifi-
cantly, largely owing to the high demand for slave labor 
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in Havana’s hinterland, the active participation of Havana 
and Cádiz merchants, and the increasing demand for sug-
ar from the English-speaking North American colonies, 
which in turn greatly boosted Cuban sugar production 
(Tornero, 1996: 38). 
In any case, none of these measures could stop the on-
going contraband trade, especially in the Spanish Greater 
Antilles. In 1770, the Spanish monarchy forced the au-
thorities in Cuba, Santo Domingo and Puerto Rico to ca-
rimbear – to brand – all slaves coming through their 
ports, as a way of proving that all due taxes and duties 
had been paid. Slave owners were also encouraged to 
prosecute the owners of unbranded slaves. In San Juan, 
Puerto Rico, this measure revealed the existence of a net-
work of slave smugglers, led by two custom officers who 
had made duplicate ‘branding irons’,4 thus forcing the au-
thorities to design new brands, years later, to prevent 
fraud.5 In Santo Domingo, the authorities began inspect-
ing slaves more carefully, and the number of unbranded 
slaves turned out to be so large that the Dominican offi-
cials asked Madrid to issue a general pardon.6Ending the 
trade in ‘smuggled negroes’ proved virtually impossible, 
despite adjustments to the supply system in the Greater 
Antilles. After1778, the Spanish slave trade project ac-
quired a new asset. With the purchase of Fernando Poo 
and Annobon, two erstwhile Portuguese dominions in 
West Africa, the Spanish monarchy attempted to establish 
commercial centres from which to buy slaves directly 
(García Cantús, 2004: 73-101). However, the paucity of 
pre­existing colonial structures in these territories, the lo-
cal populations’ resistance to the Spanish invasion, and 
environmental difficulties, especially illness, hampered 
Spanish attempts to establish an efficient commercial sys-
tem. These political and commercial measures also 
clashed with the main geostrategic interests of the monar-
chy. In 1779, Spain’s intervention in the American War of 
Independence further hamstrung Spanish measures to es-
tablish a commercial system that could operate indepen-
dently of the major British merchants. During the con-
flict, the Spanish authorities extended specific licences to 
dealers who, in defiance of the terms of these licences, 
continued to operate mostly from French Caribbean terri-
tories.
The end of the war left deep scars on British Carib-
bean dominions. The independence of the United States 
led to American traders’ expulsion from most British 
commercial circuits. In the Caribbean, this meant sever-
ing ties with territories with which Britain had maintained 
close bonds, and which had played a major role in the ex-
pansion of slavery in the Antilles, for instance by supply-
ing the food for the embarked slaves. In this context, 
Edward Barry, a representative of Fitch and Company, a 
trading house that specialised in redistributing goods 
throughout the Caribbean (O’Shaughnessy,2000: 228), 
began to negotiate a slave trade contract in 1784. The 
company was to import 4,000 slaves from Africa to Trini-
dad, and then from Trinidad to Venezuela, at 150 pesos 
apiece. In addition to providing tax exemptions, the pro-
posal specified that payment could be effected with cattle, 
which gave the company a monopoly over the cattle trade 
between Trinidad and Jamaica.7
As negotiations progressed, Edward Barry signed an 
agreement with John Black, from Trinidad, with whom he 
created the company Barry & Black. Barry was to hold 
the asiento under the same conditions agreed upon earlier 
when he had represented Fitch and Company. Almost si-
multaneously, both Edward Barry and John Black were 
given full powers as agents of Baker and Dawson 
(Piqueras and Vidal, 2018: 88). Based in Trinidad, Barry 
and Black were to provide facilities for holding slaves af-
ter the Middle Passage, as well as to organise expeditions 
to La Guaira. As far as Spanish authorities were con-
cerned, the contractor was Edward Barry, who acted as a 
member of Barry & Black and an agent of Baker and 
Dawson. In practice, the contract was exploited by Barry, 
who, alongside the captains, seamen and ships employed 
by Baker and Dawson, met the conditions of the 
agreement.8At the same time, Baker and Dawson gained 
indirect access to Spanish Caribbean market (Borucki, 
Eltis, and Wheat, 2015:450). 
The ships sailed from the Bight of Biafra, landing 
first at Trinidad,9 then sailing for La Guaira, where the 
slaves were sold. Payment was not made in La Guaira, 
but in Havana, where the slave ships had to sail to collect 
their proceedings after having received libranzas (orders 
of payment) from the Intendente in Caracas.10Mexican 
silver was used in Havana to pay for slaves brought from 
Biafra and sold in Caracas. Ultimately, most of this silver 
found its way to Liverpool, which reflects the complexity 
of the slave trade during this period, and the multiplicity of 
agents involved. The system is also a reflection of the 
Spanish monarchy’s willingness to galvanise the slave 
trade, which benefited from all the resources of the impe­
rial system (extraction and coining of silver from the mines 
of New Spain, delivery of this silver to Havana and the 
 establishment of a single account for the slave trade at the 
regional level). The financial effort made by the Real 
 Hacienda (royal treasury), which was ultimately the body 
that paid the English slave dealers in cash, made it possible 
for the slave system to thrive, boosting demand and 
establishing the productive and mercantile structures that 
supported the large-scale Spanish slave trade after 1808. 
The choice of Trinidad as the initial point of disem-
barkation responded to the need to establish a resting 
point for the captives and a control point to prevent con-
traband (Borucki, 2012: 41-42). Throughout the second 
half of the 18th century, a frenzy of slave trafficking in the 
ports of Old Calabar and Bonny had transformed Biafra 
into one of the primary areas of activity for the main Brit-
ish slave dealers (Rawley, 2005: 186). Until then, the area 
had played no more than a marginal role in the British 
trade, although ethnic conflicts, which were encouraged 
by European merchants (Nwawa, 1990: 227-245), and the 
introduction of more efficient trade transaction systems 
(Lovejoy and Richardson, 1999: 333-355), eventually fa-
cilitated the deployment of larger ships. This resulted in 
the massive arrival of so-called ‘carabalí’ slaves to Span-
ish dominions. The island’s inclusion in the Atlantic slave 
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trade stimulated commerce, thus attracting new settlers, 
which in turn improved the island’s defensive position. 
Almost simultaneously, the monarchy passed a decree of-
fering incentives to new settlers, including foreigners, in 
order to revitalise Trinidad’s economy.11
Baker and Dawson’s solvency opened the door to 
their gaining a new contract, once the one negotiated by 
Edward Barry had expired. This new asiento, which was 
directly negotiated by John Dawson and Peter Baker, 
opened the system to the harbour of Havana, in addition 
to La Guaira, and paved the way for extending it to the 
port of Santo Domingo too.12The last point was not com-
pulsory and depended on the ability of the authorities in 
Caracas to convince the ship captains to enter La Guaira 
and transport a limited number of slaves to Santo Domin-
go. The monarchy’s target was to bring 2,300 slaves to 
Havana, 1,200 to La Guaira and 1,000 to Santo Domingo 
every year.13Finally, Baker and Dawson´s reluctance led 
Santo Domingo authorities to withdraw from the agree-
ment.14
The 1786 asiento aimed to guarantee supply of slaves 
in the regions where demand was greatest: in Cuba, 
through the harbour of Havana, and the Province of Cara-
cas, with La Guaira as the main port of arrival.15The 
agreement was a tacit recognition of Spain’s inability to 
create an independent system capable of meeting the de-
mand for slaves that the Bourbon Crown was, at the same 
time, stimulating (Schneider, 2015: 3-29). The new con-
tract made no mention of Barry & Black, which had acted 
as a middleman for the previous contract.16It specified 
that the slaves were to be sold at 155 pesos apiece, and 
placed the British company and its ships’ captains at the 
heart of the system.17
Havana-bound ships had to arrive directly from Afri-
ca, without landing at any Caribbean harbour.18By insist-
ing on these terms, the elite of Havana were trying to pre-
vent potential competition posed by hacienda owners in 
Caracas, although the increased length of the voyage 
could result in higher levels of illnesses and mortality 
aboard ship. Prior to the period of liberalisation, slavery 
had not been synonymous with plantation labor in Cuba 
(De la Fuente, 2009: 147-149), Caracas (Quintero, 
2013:240-256), Santo Domingo (Widmer, 2003:143-158) 
or Puerto Rico (Caamaño, 2012: 195-224). According to 
the testimony of their respective representatives, one of 
the main problems suffered by each of these regions was 
a shortage of labour. For this reason the Bourbon monar-
chy went to considerable lengths to promote the slave 
trade.
Also in 1786, the monarchy liberalised the slave trade 
system for the first time, although only for Santo Domin-
go, a port that had proven difficult to effectively include 
in previous asientos. This measure was part of a package 
of commercial and fiscal measures which aimed to revi-
talise the colony’s economy (Gutiérrez Escudero, 2010: 
93). The model that the monarchy was trying to create 
included the promotion of export agriculture, and the reg-
ulated importation of slaves (Cassá, 2003: 246-249). Un-
til that time, the complementary nature of the two colo-
nies that shared the island had resulted in a set of 
economic interactions that included both legal and illegal 
slave sales (Moya Pons, 2008: 150-152; Belmonte, 2016). 
Informal trade, which was sometimes accepted and often 
tolerated, was enough to meet the demand, thereby ham-
pering the development of a more efficient system for im-
porting slaves. 
This partial liberalisation in Santo Domingo was a re-
sounding fiasco, either because the demand for slaves 
was not high enough and was easily met by the neigh-
bouring French colony, or because the incentives to sell 
slaves were not sufficient to attract slave merchants. San-
to Domingo’s production of sugar and cocoa, which were 
very profitable goods owing to European demand, was 
negligible (Sevilla Soler, 1981: 137-148). Although the 
promotion of tobacco production in the past had lead to a 
modest increase in production, it remained a royal mo-
nopoly, and was earmarked for the Crown’s factories in 
the Iberian Peninsula (Gutiérrez Escudero, 2011:1-13). 
The colony’s mercantile and financial structure was also 
too poorly developed to support purchases on credit, 
thereby hampering Santo Domingo’s ability to raise its 
profile in the slave trade.19
PROBLEMS WiTh ThE ASiENTO: ThE ROAD 
TO LiBERALiSATiON
The liberalisation of the slave trade in Santo Domingo 
did not meet expectations, and Baker and Dawson’s 
asiento brought thousands of slaves, mostly from the 
Bight of Biafra (carabalíes), to Cuba and Venezuela, 
where they were employed in the largest haciendas. How-
ever, some problems began to arise that brought the sys-
tem’s viability into question, especially in Cuba. The fact 
that Havana was the only harbour on the island open to 
the slave trade caused great unrest in Santiago de Cuba, 
where the demand for slaves had increased during the 
second half of the 18th century. In order to buy slaves le-
gally, Santiago hacienda owners had to travel to Havana, 
and the added transport expenses considerably increased 
their costs (Belmonte, 2010: 445-468). The landowners’ 
complaints fell on sympathetic ears in Madrid; the Crown 
was aware that successful implementation of the system 
required suppressing all incentives to deal in contraband 
(Schneider,2019). For this reason, the Baker and Dawson 
ship, the Joven Héroe, was allowed to moor in eastern 
Cuba, where she sold 190 of the 205 slaves she carried 
aboard (Belmonte, 2012: 144). 
In Havana, some arguments began to be uttered 
against the British company’s performance: there were 
complaints about the poor health of the slaves brought to 
the island, and it was argued that they did not meet the 
high level of “quality” demanded by the contract. Some 
also complained about overpricing and contraband 
activities.20The increasingly loud voices that argued 
against the renewal of Baker and Dawson’s contract were 
orchestrated by advocates of the liberalisation of the mar-
ket in Havana and Madrid. As the end of the two-year 
contract loomed nearer, their wishes were initially frus-
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trated when the Crown granted a six­month extension to 
the company.21
José Antonio Piqueras points out that the mouthpiece 
of Havana’s oligarchy, Francisco de Arango y Parreño, 
had been very active in Madrid, calling attention to the 
advantages that would follow the liberalisation of the 
slave market (Piqueras, 2009a: 164-165). In addition to 
denouncing alleged irregularities, the hacienda owners ar-
gued that renewing the asiento would be against the inter-
ests of the Crown, as it ultimately resulted in an unaccep-
table transfer of funds to a rival power. In the midst of 
these political moves, Baker and Dawson offered to sign 
a new contract in 1788, triggering an energetic reaction 
against it from Havana’s oligarchy (Piqueras, 2009b: 
273-277). At any rate, regardless of political and econom-
ic rivalries within the complex Cuban environment, it 
seems that some of the complaints issued by Havana’s 
oligarchs were fully justified, especially in the early days 
of the asiento, and that many of the slaves coming straight 
from West Africa were returned (see Table 1).
Slaves could be returned for many reasons. They 
could be in ill health after the Middle Passage or simply 
not meet the standards expected by hacienda owners or 
specified in the asiento. Astigarreta’s report is interesting 
in this regard: of the 4,939 slaves imported by Baker and 
Dawson, 3,104 (62.8%) were men, and 1,835 women 
(37.2%); 626 men were returned (20.1% of the total), 
compared to as many as 777 women (42.3%).26Therefore, 
gender seemed to be a key factor in the rejection of 
slaves.
In contrast to normal practices elsewhere on the West 
African coast, the number of women who embarked in 
Old Calabar, especially Bonny, was relatively high. In 
Bonny, females slaves accounted for 46% of the total 
(37.8% if only adult women are taken into consideration). 
Nwokeji (2010: 154-161) argues that this was because the 
Biafran women played a negligible role in agricultural 
practices. As such, the demand for female slave labour in 
the hinterland of the Bight of Biafra was low, in contrast 
to other African regions, thereby facilitating their inclu-
sion in the major British slave trade circuits.
Sex ratios aboard Baker and Dawson ships reflected 
this trend, but this did not go over well in Cuba; where it 
was considered acceptable for women to account for one-
third of the captives aboard a slave ship, a proportion 
which sufficed to cover the demand for female 
labour.27The arrival of a larger proportion of women 
caused some reservations among Cuban slave owners, 
and also in Madrid, which had been trying to develop ex-
port agriculture in the Caribbean. As was the case in 
many other Caribbean cities, the role of slave women as 
domestic servants was essential; often, these slaves were 
bought by free women, whose participation in the eco-
nomic system based on slavery kept them in a good social 
and economic position, despite their legal limitations 
(Fuentes, 2016: 75). This was, however, of little concern 
Table 1. Slaves imported by Baker and Dawson through Havana, 1786-1789.









according to Agi, 
indiferente general 
2822
Héroe 06/07/1786 Cameroon 210 210   0
Campeón 14/08/1786 Bonny 406 217 189
Princesa Real 08/10/1786 Bonny 700 230 303
El Príncipe 22/10/1786 Bonny  92  55  37
Mosley Hill22 09/05/1787 Caracas   0   8   0
Princesa Real 08/10/1787 Bonny 731 339 385
Garland 29/10/1787 Caracas 114 35   0
Héroe 17/03/1788 Benin 450 321 128
Dos Hermanos 02/04/1788 Bonny 610 429 176
Princesa Real 09/09/1788 Africa (no details given) 706 550 156
Garland23 13/01/1789 Bonny 328 444   0
Dos Hermanos24 28/03/1789 Africa (no details given) 383 367 16
Héroe 30/03/1789 Africa (no details given) 360 331 13
TOTAL 5,090 3,536 1,403
Source: Slavevoyages.org; and AGI, Indiferente General 2822.25
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to the monarchy, whose efforts were focused on develop-
ing the export agriculture sector. In the belief that women 
could not withstand the heavy labour involved in planta-
tion agriculture, the arrival of female slaves was consid-
ered detrimental, and it was even forbidden temporarily 
in the harbours of Havana and Caracas,28although this or-
der was eventually revoked.29
The fact that slave owners in Havana rejected slaves 
at a time when the demand was high raises a series of 
questions. The most important of these is what hap-
pened to those for whom no buyer could be found. Cap-
tains had the right to sell these slaves informally within 
eight days of the formal sale of the rest of the 
captives.30This was an attractive option for slave deal-
ers, who could thus recover some of their investment. 
Another option was to sell the slaves clandestinely in 
second- or third-rate harbours, which were barely with-
in, if not totally outside, governmental control (Karras, 
2007: 121-133). Similarly, we cannot rule out that at 
least some of these slaves were sent to Jamaica, where 
Baker and Dawson had close associates, and whence 
they could be redistributed to other Caribbean regions 
or, simply, sold to Jamaican buyers.
Havana’s oligarchy was not alone in asking for the 
end of the contract; similar petitions were being raised 
all over the Spanish dominions, from Louisiana to the 
viceroyalty of New Granada. Baker and Dawson, for 
their part, insisted on the necessity of signing a new 
asiento, committing to import yet more slaves at reason-
able and stable prices. Finally, the Junta Suprema de Es-
tado met to make a determination and decided that, giv-
en the shortage of labour, more resources and a new 
system should be implemented to guarantee the supply 
of slaves. The Junta decried Spain’s inability to create 
permanent commercial relations in West Africa, as had 
been done by the British, the French and the Portuguese. 
The Junta also declared that Spanish Louisiana mer-
chants’ idea of creating direct links with Africa was po-
tentially interesting but needed time. However, time was 
in short supply, given the urgency of the demands com-
ing from Caracas and Havana.
The Junta was also sympathetic to the complaints of 
Cuban hacienda owners, who had pointed out that, while 
the contract had facilitated the arrival of a large number 
of slaves, it also led to an increase in contraband and 
fraud against royal revenues. For these reasons, the Junta 
decided to extend the period of grace given to Santo Do-
mingo in 1786 and to liberalise the slave traffic as the best 
way of promoting export agriculture and trade.31The Bak-
er and Dawson´s request was rejected, and the slave trade 
to Cuba, Santo Domingo, Puerto Rico and the Province of 
Caracas was liberalised on February 28, 1789.
PROBLEMS WiTh AND SOLUTiONS fOR ThE 
LiBERALiSED SLAVE TRADE
The liberalisation of the slave trade was not the end of 
Baker and Dawson’s activities. From April 1789 to De-
cember 1790, their ships Benjamin, Blaydes, Two Broth-
ers, Héroe and Thomas arrived in Havana with enormous 
slave cargoes.32The main difference was that harbours 
which had hitherto been virtually closed to the slave trade 
were now open to British, French, Danish and Spanish 
slave merchants. Most of the slaves were brought from 
other Caribbean islands with strong commercial links to 
Havana, despite being owned by rivals of the Spanish 
monarchy. The new rules of the slave trade encouraged 
and legitimised a set of commercial relationships that had 
long played a crucial structural role in the region, often in 
abeyance of legal restrictions. Far from trying to flush 
foreign merchants out of the slave trade system, Spanish 
authorities endeavoured to recruit all possible resources 
for their project, encouraging their operation in nearly 
every port. The only exception was Santiago de Cuba, 
which was open only to Spanish ships. The close com-
mercial bonds that existed between the eastern Cuban 
capital and various ports in Jamaica, such as Kingston 
and Montego Bay, were the reason behind this exception, 
which was an attempt to prevent contraband from getting 
out of hand.
The new rules generated doubts and concerns which 
local authorities promptly relayed to Madrid. Between 
1789 and November 1791, when the trade’s liberalisation 
came into full force, various reports from Havana, Cara-
cas, San Juan and Santo Domingo were sent to the penin-
sula in order to clarify a number of grey areas. In Santo 
Domingo, where not a single slave had arrived legally 
since the liberalisation of the trade, the main concern re-
ferred to point 8 of the new regulations. In this point, the 
king had stated that the aim of the legal change was to 
promote agriculture, and that slave owners who did not 
put their slaves to work on haciendas were to be penalised 
by 2 pesos per year.33The concerned Santo Domingo city 
council asked Madrid whether this measure was to be ap-
plied retroactively. The governor of Santo Domingo, 
Joaquín García, reminded the Crown that the liberalisa-
tion of 1786, which concerned the import of tax free 
slaves, had not had the desired effects, owing to the ruin-
ous state of the colony. Should this measure be imple-
mented, he claimed, the citizens of the colony would suf-
fer, and no one would profit other than foreign merchants 
(who were the only merchants capable of sending slaving 
voyages to Santo Domingo). 
The governor also pointed out that slaves were needed 
in the colony, although he admitted that most of them 
were employed as domestic servants, shepherds and hired 
workers. The new regulations were an attempt to change 
this situation. Stock-keeping, domestic service and other 
trades, especially in urban contexts, were profitable for 
slave owners, but generated little royal revenue. For this 
reason, the Crown decided to ‘encourage’ slave owners 
by means of taxation, prompting them to put their slaves 
to work in sectors where there was a large international 
demand. Royal authorities clarified that this applied only 
to those slaves imported within the framework of the new 
norms, not retroactively, while also indicating that it was 
desirable to limit the number of domestic slaves and those 
used as hired workers.34
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In San Juan, Puerto Rico, Antonio Liyá, captain of the 
schooner San José y las Ánimas, claimed to have brought 
in four slaves who were being employed on a sugar estate 
owned by his ship’s owner. After paying the compulsory 
duties, he attempted to claim his money back because he 
had complied with the new regulations. This petition was 
rejected on the grounds that fiscal exemptions were ap-
plicable only to ships loading slaves – and only slaves – 
in foreign colonies, whereas Liyá had imported additional 
‘goods’, rendering him ineligible for a return. With this 
measure, the authorities were trying to curtail contraband 
activities from taking place under the umbrella of slave 
trading. In order to avoid fraud, the governor of Puerto 
Rico arranged for heavy sanctions to be applied to slave 
ships that landed at bays or other mooring points before 
entering the city’s port. In addition, in order to prosecute 
smugglers and to calculate the number of slaves being 
employed in domestic service or in non-agricultural 
trades, the governor compelled the district mayors in San 
Juan and military officials in the rest of the island to carry 
out periodical censuses, carefully recording slaves who 
worked outside haciendas.35
In Caracas, the new regulations prompted the Inten-
dente Guillelmi to ask for clarification regarding different 
factors that could have an effect on the normal operation 
of the slave trade. Guillelmi asked whether the limits of 
the province were the same as those of his Intendencia; in 
other words, whether Maracaibo, Barinas, Cumaná, Trini-
dad and the island of Margarita were authorised to take 
part in the new system. In his opinion, by authorising 
only La Guaira and Puerto Cabello, other provinces were 
prevented from benefiting from the new system. The In-
tendente suggested that Cumaná, Nueva Barcelona and 
Maracaibo be included, thereby allowing the whole coun-
try to benefit from the importation of slaves brought from 
‘foreign colonies’. Guillelmi was also concerned about 
the taxes to be levied on local (Spanish American) slave 
merchants, especially given the expenses involved in 
bringing slaves from other colonies.36 Along the same 
lines, the Intendente also expressed doubts about the type 
and quality of the products that could be used as payment 
for the new workforce. The reply from Madrid was that 
products fell into two categories: those which were of in-
terest to Spanish trade, and those which were not. In the 
Crown’s opinion, products such as cocoa and indigo, 
which were in high demand among Spanish merchants, 
should on no account be used to buy slaves because this 
would severely undermine Spanish merchants based in 
Cádiz. The metropolitan authorities pointed out that this 
decision would increase contraband, but that this would 
be compensated by the increase in agricultural produc-
tion. 
Guillelmi was also concerned about the “quality” of 
the slaves arriving in Venezuela. The Intendente pointed 
out that article six of the new regulations clearly estab-
lished that slaves of ‘bad breed’ were to be rejected. Not-
ing that carabalíes were famous for their allegedly super-
stitious (agorera) nature, Guillelmi suggested treating 
them like ‘the disabled, the ill, or those suffering from the 
usual malaises’. Madrid’s response was that a slave could 
be “agorero” and still work very hard, and that the deci-
sion should ultimately fall to the experts, namely the ha-
cienda owners. The government’s only duty was to pre-
vent the arrival of ill slaves, and the selection of enslaved 
workers should be left to merchants and slave 
owners.37The Intendente’s questions may have been a 
subtle way of trying to get rid of the British merchants, 
who controlled the trade from Biafra. 
In Havana, the main doubts revolved around the tax to 
be applied to slaves working in non-agricultural occupa-
tions: was the tax to be applied retroactively? Was it the 
same for men and women, and for slaves living in the city 
as opposed to the countryside? Finally, did it apply to 
slaves labouring on public works?38After ruling out retro-
activity, the Junta de Estado decided that since women 
were less necessary in agriculture but constituted most of 
the domestic workers, where they were the main support 
of ‘honest families and widows’, they should be either 
exempt from the tax or pay only half.39
In Santiago de Cuba the arrival of the French brig El 
Soberbio from Dominica with 197 slaves on board caused 
a conflict between the governor of Santiago and the is-
land’s Capitán General. The ship, captained by Jean Cou-
ture, was on its way to Havana when contrary winds and 
some technical problems forced her to dock in Santiago. 
While the ship was being repaired, Couture asked permis-
sion to sell some of the slaves he carried aboard, and the 
governor consented, sending copies of his decision to the 
Capitán General and to Madrid. After selling 26 slaves, 
the ship sailed for Havana, regardless of the decisions 
adopted by the Capitán General.40This case exemplifies 
the conflicts of interests between institutions and also re-
veals the use of large ships in the intra-regional slave 
trade (Felipe, 2019). Although most of this regional trade 
was carried out on small and medium-sized ships, larger 
expeditions linking the redistribution hubs and the re-
gions of high demand were fairly common.41
The arrival in Havana of the British frigate Blaydes on 
June 11, 1789 highlighted the hurdles that the new regula-
tions could plant in the path of Baker and Dawson’s ships. 
The ship’s captain, John Simmons, at first did not allow 
any official to come on board to conduct an inspection. 
After a series of vicissitudes, the inspection finally took 
place, and the slaves were disembarked.42Soon after-
wards, on October 28, another Baker and Dawson frigate 
named the Garland, commanded by William Forbes, ar-
rived in the same harbour. This arrival made port authori-
ties suspicious; the Blaydes was still there, and it was 
feared that both ships were involved in a coordinated 
smuggling operation.43The Intendente Hernani also point-
ed out that Baker and Dawson’s ships exceeded the maxi-
mum size allowed; article 10 of the regulations specified 
that slave ships should be under 300 tonnes, whereas the 
British ships were believed to be ‘able to carry 40 guns’.44
The frigate Garland was also involved in a series of 
controversies with the authorities in Havana which con-
siderably delayed the disembarkation and sale of the 
slaves it carried. After the ship’s arrival, the Marquis del 
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Real Socorro, one of the main slave owners in Havana, 
arrived at the ship to negotiate. Captain Forbes refused, 
however, claiming that the sale had to take place under 
his direct supervision. Forbes was repeatedly asked to 
hand over the slaves to avoid injury “to the public and to 
yourself”. His continued refusal led the Capitán General, 
after consulting with Intendente Hernani, to appoint Cap-
tain Joseph de Villena to immediately begin negotiations, 
while also threatening to take the slaves by force if they 
were not handed over within the day. Finally, one and a 
half months after arriving in Havana, the slaves were dis-
embarked and promptly sold.45
ESTiMATED NUMBERS Of SLAVES
The changes introduced to trade regulations prompted 
Baker and Dawson to try to sign a new and exclusive 
contract.46Although they had some support in Havana and 
Caracas, neither the authorities nor the majority of citi-
zens in Cuba and Venezuela were in favour of a new con-
tract. Hacienda owners and merchants from Havana and 
Santiago de Cuba jointly emphasized that the previous 
asiento had not provided the expected results, that Baker 
and Dawson’s promise to bring 5,000 or 6,000 slaves per 
year was not credible given their previous history, and, 
especially, that a monopoly contract would bring an end 
to the free trade system, which was yielding very good 
results.47Indeed, the liberalisation policy had resulted in a 
constant stream of slaves that was being channelled 
through various ports, and finally meeting demand (see 
Table 2).
The liberalisation of the slave trade confirmed Cuba’s 
role as the main slave market in the Spanish Caribbean. 
Over 83% of all the slaves imported as a result of this early 
policy of liberalisation ended up being delivered to Cuba, 
with Havana acting as the main port of disem barkation. 
Santiago de Cuba was the second most important market in 
the Spanish Caribbean, despite the fact that it was open 
only to Spanish merchants. Moreover, Santiago de Cuba 
was the main port of arrival for slaves brought from Ja-
maica, who were afterwards redistributed to Puerto Prínci-
pe, Trinidad and Havana. This created a distribution net-
work that satisfied the demand of enclaves along the 
southern coast of Cuba that were not authorised to receive 
Table 2. Ships and Slaves entering the Ports of Havana, Santiago de Cuba, La Guaira, Puerto Cabello and San Juan, April 
1789-December 1790.





















Spanish 959 13.2 0 0 27 959
Foreign 3,537 48.6 14 2,798 13 739
Danish 247 3.4 0 0 3 247
United States 619 8.5 5 582 1 37
France 557 7.6 1 262 3 295
United Kingdom 2,114 29.1 8 1,954 7 160
Total 4,496 61.8 14 2,798 41 1,698
Santiago  
de Cuba
Spanish 1,552 21.3 0 0 111 1,552
Foreign 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 1,552 21.3 0 0 111 1,552
La guaira
Spanish 284 3.9 0 0 10 284
Foreign 207 2.9 0 0 8 207
Total 491 6.8 0 0 18 491
Puerto 
Cabello
Spanish 203 2.8 0 0 12 203
Foreign 56 0.8 1 5 3 51
Total 259 3.6 1 5 15 254
San Juan49
Spanish 116 1.6 0 0 36 116
Foreign 359 4.9 0 0 37 359
Total 475 6.5 0 0 73 475
Overall total 7,273 100 15 2,803 258 4,470
Source: AGI, Indiferente General 2822, 2823; Santo Domingo 2207; and Santo Domingo 2310.
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slaves directly, although some of these slaves were sent on-
ward to Havana as well (Chaviano, 2014: 152-153; Bel-
monte, 2010: 458). For instance, the schooner San Ignacio, 
under the command of Pedro Salazar, sailed from Santiago 
de Cuba on June10, 1790. Officially, she was carrying 
3,500 silver pesos fuertes and 25 pounds of tortoiseshell to 
buy slaves. She moored in Montego Bay, on the northern 
coast of Jamaica, where she embarked 46 slaves (31 men, 
11 boys identified as “mulecones” and “muleques”, and 4 
women) before returning to Santiago, where she landed on 
July 2. That same day, after selling some slaves in Santia-
go, she sailed for Havana with 37 slaves (27 men, eight 
boys listed as “mulecones” and “muleques,” and two wom-
en), and arrived on July18, 1790.50Speed was of the es-
sence for the success of these expeditions, as this kept 
down maintenance costs, wages and sailing expenses, as 
well as ensuring that the slaves arrived alive.
Santiago de Cuba also became the main centre of op-
erations for Spanish slave dealers who specialised in the 
intra-American trade, surpassing Havana. In the Province 
of Caracas, La Guaira was much more active than Puerto 
Cabello, importing roughly the same number of slaves as 
San Juan de Puerto Rico; it is worth noting that while 
Spanish merchants were predominant in La Guaira, their 
role in San Juan was less prominent. Overall, 42.8% of all 
slaves arriving in all of these Spanish Caribbean ports 
combined during this period were imported by Spanish 
merchants, which reveal the existence of a solid inter­co-
lonial mercantile structure that could successfully adapt 
to the new regulations. Most of these captives arrived on 
voyages that sailed from other ports in the Caribbean; of 
273 ships that landed slaves in Spanish Caribbean ports in 
1789-1790, only 15 came from Africa (see Table 3); of all 
the slaves imported during this period, 61.4% were 
brought from American harbours (Table 4). Havana suc-
cessfully operated within both transatlantic and intra-
American circuits, and maintained especially close links 
with Dominica, Jamaica, Saint Thomas, and even some 
ports in the southern United States (Borucki, Eltis and 
Wheat, 2015:443-445).
Santiago de Cuba, by contrast, was heavily dependent 
on its contacts with Jamaica; its transactions with other 
harbours such as Saint Domingue, Providence (Baha-
mas), and Saint Eustatius were sporadic. Santiago spe-
cialised in intra-Caribbean trade, which was mostly car-
ried out by small ships bringing a few slaves at a time. To 
a large extent, this was because, despite the government’s 
efforts, the slave trade was used to cover up illicit mer-
cantile activities.51This model of intra-colonial trade was 
also predominant in the remaining authorised harbours, 
which likewise traded primarily with other Caribbean ter-
ritories. The circuit linking La Guaira and Trinidad, 
which was articulated during the period of the asiento, re-
mained active although the number of slaves channelled 
through this circuit decreased sharply. Surpassing even 
Curaçao, Saint Croix, Dominica, and Saint Domingue, 
Trinidad remained the most important redistribution node 
for the Spanish Caribbean during this period, channelling 
its slaves through La Guaira.
Its geographical proximity to the coast of Venezuela 
and its pre­existing commercial relations allowed 
Curaçao to become the main supplier of slaves to Puerto 
Cabello, where demand was much smaller than that of the 
La Guaira–Caracas axis, and where ships arrived directly 
from Africa or from Saint Croix only sporadically. San 
Juan de Puerto Rico, on the other hand, owing to its loca-
tion near a point where the frontiers of several empires 
converged, maintained multiple links with the Lesser An-
tilles in which Danish merchants from Saint Thomas 
played a prominent role. Spanish merchants played a sec-
ondary role in San Juan, generally buying slaves and 
probably other goods as well in Curaçao. The “Coast of 
Guinea” (probably the region around Calabar) was the 
point of embarkation for most enslaved people transport-
ed from Africa, who were invariably delivered to Havana. 
Jamaica, Dominica, Curaçao and the Danish islands of 
Saint Croix and Saint Thomas were the Spanish colonies’ 
main sources of captives within the non-Hispanic Carib-
bean, acting as intermediary slaving hubs that redistribut-
ed captives brought via transatlantic routes. 
The policy of liberalisation was a success for both the 
Spanish monarchy and for Spanish Caribbean slave mer-
chants, and this led the metropolitan authorities to rule 
out returning to the asiento system. In February 1791, the 
publication of royal orders informed Caribbean governors 
of a six­year extension to the system of free trade. In ad-
dition, the viceroyalties of New Granada and the Río de 
la Plata asked to have their ports included in this lucrative 
business, and they, too, found a sympathetic ear in Ma-
drid. However, the news of the revolution in Saint 
Domingue in August 1791 paralysed the Spanish admin-
istration. After months of deliberations, pressures, and 
contradictions, the main interlocutor of Havana’s oligar-
chy, the Madrid-based Francisco de Arango y Parreño, 
delivered an eloquent proclamation. As a representative 
of the sector which had benefited the most from the liber-
alisation of the slave trade, Arango insisted on the need to 
continue with the free trade policy. This was to be the be-
ginning of mass slavery in the Spanish Caribbean. The 
destruction of Saint Domingue was to be followed by a 
transfer of slaves, capital and qualified personnel, and the 
Spanish dominions would take advantage of this. Aran-
go’s manoeuvres tilted the scales (Ferrer, 2014; Piqueras, 
2009a), influencing the Crown’s eventual decision to ex-
tend the free trade system for another six years, authoris-
ing additional ports in Cuba and Venezuela, as well as in 
the viceroyalties of New Granada and Río de la 
Plata.53Despite political turbulence in France, which re-
sulted in a prohibition against trading with the Spanish 
Caribbean (Naranjo, 2017: 111-130; Zeuske, 2015), and 
despite open political tensions with the United Kingdom, 
the slave trade to the Spanish Caribbean continued albeit 
intermittently. Conflict between the various empires pre-
sent in the Caribbean from 1793 onwards hampered intra-
Caribbean trade, and despite the succession of military 
defeats suffered by the Spanish navy, Spanish Caribbean 
slave merchants began trying in earnest to establish per-
manent commercial links with West Africa. However, 
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Table 3. Origin of Ships and Numbers of Slaves entering the Ports of Havana, Santiago de Cuba, La Guaira, Puerto Cabello and San 
Juan, April 1789-1790.
Spanish harbour Region of origin Number of ships Number of slaves
havana
Coast of Guinea 13 2,628




Providence (Bahamas) 5 117
Jamaica 23 641




Saint Domingue 7 75
Providence 1 1








Saint Croix 5 120




African coast 1 5
Saint Croix 1 15
Foreign colonies (not specified) 1 31
Total 16 259
San Juan de Puerto Rico52
Antigua 3 30
Curaçao 16 49
Saint Domingue 2 9
Saint Eustatius 9 25
Saint Croix 23 260
Santiago de Cuba 1 4
Saint Thomas 18 95
Trinidad 1 3
Total 73 475
Sources: AGI, Indiferente General 2822, 2823; Santo Domingo 2207; and Santo Domingo 2310.
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Spanish merchants in Cuba and Puerto Rico only man-
aged to achieve this from 1808 onwards, when the Span-
ish colonial system began to collapse.
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NOTES
1 According to slavevoyages.org (http://www.slavevoyages.org/
voyage/82810/variables), this expedition was successful and 
ended with the sale of the slaves at La Guaira. However, as we 
shall see, the sale of the 453 slaves on board did not take place 
in Venezuela.
2 The Baker and Dawson trading house was the most important 
Atlantic slave trading firm between 1783 and 1792 (Behrendt, 
1990:104).
3 Carmen Barcia points out that most of the slaves who arrived in 
Cuba after 1773 came from Jamaica (Barcia, 2016:59).
4 Archivo General de Indias (AGI), Santo Domingo 2283: letter 
from the governor Miguel de Nuesas to the Council of the In-
dies. San Juan, 3 May 1776.
5 AGI, Santo Domingo 2283: decree by the Council of the Indies. 
Madrid, 7 May 1779.
6 AGI, Santo Domingo 983: report by the governor and the royal 
officials in Santo Domingo, explaining that the number of smug-
gled slaves was too high. Santo Domingo, 24 February 1773.
7 AGI, Indiferente General 2821: Eduardo Barry, a dealer from 
Jamaica, as a member and legal representative of Fitch and 
Company sets conditions for an import asiento for negroes from 
the island of Trinidad. El Pardo, 13 February 1784.
8 The relationship between Barry & Black and Baker and Daw-
son ended up in court. The default of some payments related to 
‘slaves and other trade goods’ led Baker and Dawson to sue 
Barry & Black. In 1787, the Spanish authorities confiscated and 
auctioned the company’s and the agents’ property, in order to 
satisfy the debt with the proceedings. When the confiscation 
took place, Barry & Black owed nearly 100,000 pesos. AGI, 
Indiferente General 2824: Baker and Dawson’s claim against 
Eduardo Barry and Juan Black. San Lorenzo, 24 October 1788.
9 AGI, Indiferente General 2824: Governor Chacón reports on 
the actions undertaken between the Intendente of Caracas and 
the Audiencia. Isla Trinidad, 18 July 1793.
10 AGI, Indiferente General 2824: the Intendente de Ejército in Ha-
vana reports on the arrival of Baker and Dawson’s first asiento 
ship. Havana, 7 July 1786. The monarchy had established a sin-
gle account to pay for the slaves sold under the contract. The ac-
count was based in Havana and was funded from New Spain. 
11 AGI, Santo Domingo 2588: decree by H.M. which regulates 
settlement and trade in the island of Trinidad de Barlovento. 
San Lorenzo, 24 November 1783.
Table 4. Origin of Slaves entering the Ports of Havana, Santiago de Cuba, La Guaira, Puerto Cabello and San Juan de Puerto Rico, 
April 1789-1790.
Region of origin Number of slaves % Number of ships %
Coast of Guinea 2,628 36.1 13 4.8
Jamaica 2,053 28.2 125 45.8
Dominica 680 9.3 8 2.9
Saint Croix 395 4.9 29 10.6
Saint Thomas 352 4.4 22 8
Curaçao 292 3.7 32 11.7
Trinidad 194 2.4 6 2.2
Gold Coast 170 2.1 1 0.4
Saint Domingue 143 1.8 11 4
Providence (Bahamas) 118 1.5 6 2.2
Saint Eustatius 89 1.1 10 3.6
Charleston 38 0.5 2 0.7
Foreign colonies (not specified) 31 0.4 1 0.4
Grenada 30 0.4 1 0.4
Antigua 30 0.4 3 1.1
Virginia 21 0.3 1 0.4
African Coast 5 0.1 1 0.4
Santiago de Cuba 4 0.1 1 0.4
Total 7,273 100 273 100
Source: AGI, Indiferente General 2822, 2823; Santo Domingo 2207; and Santo Domingo 2310.
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12 The agreement recognised the right of the Spanish authorities to 
confiscate other cargoes found during their inspections. Baker 
and Dawson tried to include ivory tusks and palm oil in the 
agreement, and argued that they were also African goods. AGI, 
Indiferente General 2824: reply from Baker and Dawson to 
Bernardo del Campo about the negro contract. Liverpool, 23 
January 1786.
13 AGI, Santo Domingo 2824: the Intendente of Caracas confirms 
reception of royal order of 20 July about negro cargoes. Cara-
cas, 20 October 1786.
14 AGI, Indiferente General 2824: the Intendente de Ejército in 
Havana replies to the royal order of 20 July, committing to pay 
for the Negroes subject to the asiento granted to Baker and 
Dawson and sold in Havana and Santo Domingo. Havana, 10 
October 1786.
15 This agreement also implied the cancellation of the personal li-
cences granted, especially after America’s War of Independ-
ence. AGI, Indiferente General 2821: Royal order of 22 April 
1786 revoking personal licences for the import of slaves.
16 Despite Barry & Black’s attempts to continue acting as the 
company’s agents. Baker and Dawson sent a new agent to Cara-
cas, Philip Langton. AGI, Indiferente General 2824: the Inten-
dente of Caracas explains the reasons it accepted the arrival of 
negro cargoes belonging to Baker and Dawson. Caracas, 11 
June 1786.
17 The arrival of the first ship, the Héroe, predated the arrival of 
the orders concerning the asiento. As such, the Intendente of 
Havana ruled out paying for the slaves with public funds, as 
was customary when the previous contract was in force. The 
proceedings came from the public auction of the slaves, with 
the consent of the captain of the slave ship, William Forbes, 
who insisted on conducting the auction himself. AGI, Indifer-
ente General 2824: the Intendente de Ejército in Havana reports 
on his decision to let the English captain sell the Negroes as he 
pleased, subject to the Baker and Dawson asiento. Havana, 20 
July 1786.
18 AGI, Indiferente General 2824: signed copy of the contract 
with Pedro Baker and Juan Dawson. London, 1 May 1786.
19 AGI, Santo Domingo 949: report from the Capitán General of 
Santo Domingo, Joaquín García. Santo Domingo, 25 August 
1789.
20 AGI, Indiferente General 2824: the governor of Havana for-
wards a statement by hacienda owners which insists on a peti-
tion issued by the Junta Central de negros. Havana, 3 January 
1789.
21 AGI, Indiferente General 2824: the Intendente de Ejército of 
Havana replies to the royal order of 31 August 1787. Havana, 2 
January 1788. At the end of this extension, three Baker and 
Dawson ships were allowed to enter Spanish harbours, the 
Princesa Real, the Garland and the brig Joven Héroe, where 
they enjoyed the same conditions as when the asiento was in 
force. AGI, Indiferente General 2824: royal order of 18 June 
1788, permitting access to three ships belonging to Baker and 
Dawson, after the end of the extension.
22 The Mosley Hill left Bonny with 736 slaves, heading to La 
Guaira, where she delivered 674. Afterwards, she sailed to Ha-
vana to sell the remaining slaves. Strangely, the sale of only 
eight slaves is recorded there, raising questions about the real 
nature of this voyage and the real number of slaves sold. It is 
possible that the accusations levelled at Baker and Dawson for 
carrying out irregular commercial activities were, to some ex-
tent, true. The trip to Havana is not recorded in slavevoyages.
org (http://www.slavevoyages.org/voyage/82808/variables).
23 This expedition is described differently on slavevoyages.org. 
There is a record of a voyage which began in Bonny and ended 
at an unspecified point in the Spanish Caribbean with the sale of 
328 slaves. The beginning and end dates would have been 15 
May 1788 and 2 April 1789:http://www.slavevoyages.org/voy-
age/81551/variables. The end date suggests that the expeditions 
referred to on slavevoyages.org and in AGI are, indeed, the 
same expedition, although the number of slaves delivered and 
the final destination do not coincide.
24 Both this ship and the next on the list, the Héroe, arrived in Ha-
vana after the liberalisation of the slave markets, but were al-
lowed to carry out their expedition under the same conditions 
that had applied when the asiento was in force.
25 AGI, Indiferente General 2822: Francisco Antonio de Astigar-
reta, administrator of the royal accounts in Havana, certifies the 
balance of the contract with Liverpudlian merchants Pedro 
Baquer and Juan Dawson. Havana, 23 May 1789. Twenty-sev-
en slaves died while awaiting disembarkation and, therefore, 
Astigarreta did not include them in his statistics.
26 AGI, Indiferente General 2822: Francisco Antonio de Astigar-
reta, administrator of the royal accounts in Havana, certifies the 
balance of the contract with Liverpudlian merchants Pedro 
Baquer and Juan Dawson. Havana, 23 May 1789. Although 
Astigarreta records accounts for all arrivals, only the gender of 
the rejects is recorded, and no conclusions may be drawn con-
cerning age groups and physical condition.
27 AGI, Indiferente General 2824: the Intendente de Ejército of 
Havana sends a copy of the proceedings of the meeting cele-
brated after the arrival of the first negro cargo by Baker and 
Dawson. [Havana], 13 October 1786. The Intendente pointed 
out that, “in the next ones, we can only accept one­third of fe-
males and two-thirds of males, which is the customary propor-
tion, and because females are less in demand, and will be hard 
to sell”.
28 AGI, Indiferente General 2824:the Intendente de Caracas re-
plies to the royal order of 22 February 1787, establishing that 
Baker and Dawson’s cargoes contain no females. Caracas, 31 
May 1787.
29 AGI, Indiferente General 2824: communication by Messrs. 
Baker and Dawson, Liverpool (England) merchants, to H.M. 
with the intercession of the Marquis del Campo, plenipotentiary 
minister of H.M. in London. Liverpool, 30 October 1787.
30 AGI, Indiferente General 2824: the Intendente de Ejército of 
Havana sends certified copy of the Junta de Real Hacienda. 
Havana, 8 August 1786.
31 AGI, Indiferente General 2822:decision by the Junta Suprema 
de Estado. Madrid, 10 February 1789.
32 AGI, Indiferente General 2822: List ships loaded with Negroes 
ships arriving to Havana. Havana, 13 October 1790 andAGI, 
Santo Domingo 2207. 
33 AGI, Indiferente General 2821: royal decree of 28 February 
1789.
34 AGI, Indiferente General 2822: the governor of Santo Domin-
go, Joaquín García, demands clarification concerning some 
doubts with regard to article eight of the royal decree of 28 Feb-
ruary 1789. Santo Domingo, 25 February 1790.
35 AGI, Santo Domingo 2310:report on compliance of the royal 
decree of 1789 concerning the arrival of negros, their number 
and other related matters. San Juan, 3 March 1791.
36 In addition to silver, in Santiago de Cuba, mules, cattle, sugar, red 
wine, liquor, olives and many other products, including yarey 
hats, were used to pay for slaves. These forms of payment in-
cluded not only local products but also European goods, which 
were now widely available in the Caribbean after the new com-
mercial regulations of 1778. This expanded supply chiefly bene-
fited intra­regional trade (Belmonte, 2012:168­169).
37 AGI, Indiferente General 2822: Intendente Guillelmi, from Ca-
racas, asks 12 questions about the royal decree of 28 February 
1789. Caracas, 9 August 1791.
38 AGI, Indiferente General 2826: the Intendente de Ejercito in 
Havana sends a copy of the Junta about the negro tax. Havana, 
8 June 1789.
39 AGI, Indiferente General 2826:Junta Suprema de Estado. Ma-
drid, 11 January 1790.
40 El Soberbio arrived in Havana in February 1790 and sold 190 
slaves. AGI, Indiferente General 2822: list of ships loaded with 
negroes arriving in Havana. Havana, 13 October 1790. 
41 The French ship La Juana, again from Dominica, also arrived 
in Havana in February 1790, with 102 slaves. AGI, Indiferente 
General 2822: list of ships loaded with negroes arriving in Ha-
vana. Havana, 13 October 1790.
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42 AGI, Indiferente General 2822: the Intendente de Ejercito of 
Havana reports the arrival on June 11 of an English frigate with 
negroes. Havana, 6 July 1789.
43 Article 11 of the regulations established that foreign ships 
should remain in the ports only for as long as it took to disem-
bark and sell the slaves, after which the ships should set sail 
within 24 hours.
44 AGI, Indiferente General 2822: the Intendente de Ejercito of 
Havana reports the arrival of a ship, belonging to Baker and 
Dawson, with negroes. Havana, 9 November 1789. The royal 
decree of 8 March 1791 increased the maximum allowed size to 
500 tons.
45 AGI, Indiferente General 2822:the Gobernador Interino of Ha-
vana reports on the incident that occurred with the English frig-
ate Garland. Havana, 11 December 1789.
46 AGI, Indiferente General 2822: El Gobernador de Habana Luis de 
las Casas sends proposal presented by Baker and Dawson to intro-
duce 5,000 or more African negroes. Havana, 27 March 1791.
47 AGI, Indiferente General 2822: declaration of the citizens and 
hacienda owners from Havana. Havana, 30 December 1790.
48 Only the records from Havana specify the flag under which 
ships sailed. In the other harbours, the records indicate only 
whether the ship was Spanish or foreign.
49 The figures corresponding to Puerto Rico cover the period be-
tween 1 January and 31 December 1790.
50 AGI, Indiferente General 2823: list of the slave ships leaving 
Santiago de Cuba, Santiago de Cuba, 30 June 1792; AGI, In-
diferente General 2822: list of slave ships entering Havana. Ha-
vana, 13 October 1790.
51 In 1792, the governor of Santiago de Cuba was harshly repri-
manded by Madrid because of the ‘scandalous contraband’ 
from Jamaica, shipped under the umbrella of the slave trade. 
AGI, Indiferente General 2823: royal decree of 24 October 
1792, to the governor of Cuba.
52 The figures corresponding to Puerto Rico cover the period be-
tween 1 January and 31 December 1790.
53 Harbours authorised after the extension of the system included 
Buenos Aires, Montevideo, Puerto Cabello, La Guaira, Maracai-
bo, Cumaná, Nueva Barcelona, Santo Domingo, San Juan de 
Puerto Rico, Cartagena and Havana. Ports open to Spanish slave 
dealers were Nuevitas, Batabanó, Santiago de Cuba, Trinidad and 
Riohacha. AGI, Indiferente General 2822:royal decree authoris-
ing the free slave trade in the viceroyalties of Santa Fe, Buenos 
Aires, Capitanía General of Caracas and the islands of Santo Do-
mingo, Cuba and Puerto Rico, to Spanish and foreign dealers un-
der the attached rules. San Lorenzo, 24 November 1791.
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